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Chapter 1
Full vs. no information best choice game
with finite horizon
Marek Skarupski∗ and Krzysztof Szajowski†
Wrocław University of Science and Technology
Krzysztof.Szajowski@pwr.edu.pl‡
Let us consider a two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in
buying a set of some goods. The company A is a big corporation and it
knows the actual value of the good on the market and is able to observe
the previous values of them. The company B has no information about
the actual value of the good but it can compare the actual position of the
good on the market with the previous position of the good offered. Both
of the players want to choose the very best object overall. The recall is
not allowed. The number of the objects is fixed and finite. One can think
about these two types of buyers a business customer vs. an individual
customer. The mathematical model of the competition between them is
presented and the solution is defined and constructed.
1. Introduction.
The very well known secretary problem has also many modifications. Fer-
guson1 has made a review of the concepts of the best choice problem going
back to the age of Kepler and Cayley. Presman and Sonin2 considered
so called no-information problem in which the appearing objects comes
from the rank distribution, i.e. that the objects are observable, the de-
cision maker can rank them and all permutations of the appearing ob-
jects are equally possible. Another approach was presented by Gilbert and
Mosteller3 where the exact value of the object is observable, and the distri-
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bution of the object is known (it is assumed to be an uniform distribution
on the interval [0, 1]). Both of the ideas can be described as an optimal stop-
ping of Markov chain. In both of them there is only one decision maker and
there is no competition concept. The game concept of the secretary problem
was introduced by Dynkin.4 Many examples were solved by Yasuda.5,6
1.1. Business motivation.
Consider a two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in buying a
set of some goods, ex. an asset on a stock exchange. Th company A is a big
corporation and it knows the actual value of the good on the market. What
is more it knows the previous values of the objects and can compare them
together. The problem of the company B is that it has no information
about the actual value of the good. However the owner of the company
B can compare the actual position of the good in the market with the
previous observations. Both of the players want to choose the very best
object overall without possibility of recall. The number of the objects is
fixed and finite. A very good example can be described from the position of
reliability. Consider a two buyers of the same item. Both of them want to
buy the most reliable object. The buyer A has possibility to get know the
reliability function values derived by the experts and quality controllers.
The player B has no such a contact and intelligence, so he must rely on his
basic knowledge and the knowledge of the previous observation, i.e. he can
judge is the object better or worse than the previous one. We can say that
the buyers of the objects are two types: first is a business customer and
second is an individual customer.
1.2. Related game models.
The considered game recalls various conflict driven by the stochastic se-
quences. Usually the bilateral setting of the decision problem is preceded
by unilateral consideration. The form of the optimal strategy in the deci-
sion problem is the inspiration for mean-value formulation. The threshold
strategies are crucial tool for the optimal stopping problems. The simplest
case related to observation of a sequences of random variables can be found
e.g. in papers [7] or [8]. The bilateral extension of these models can be
found in the papers [9]. Two players, I and II, observe sequentially a
known finite number (or a number having a geometric distribution) of in-
dependent and identically distributed random variables. They must choose
the largest. The variables cannot be perfectly observed. When a random
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variable is sampled, the sampler is informed only whether it is greater or
less than some level he has specified. Each player can choose at most one
observation. After the sampling, the players decide for acceptance or re-
jection of the observation. If both accept the same observation, Player 1
has the priority. The class of adequate strategies and a gain function are
constructed. In the finite case, the game has a solution in pure strategies.
In the case of a geometric distribution, Player 1 has a pure equilibrium
strategy and Player 2 has either a pure equilibrium strategy or a mixture
of two pure strategies. The game is symmetrical as the players are watch-
ing the same string to the same extent. Increasing the opposing interests is
possible by the completely different preferences of the players. Evaluation
of the same object by two decision makers can mean that players observe
the different coordinates of the vector and formulate their expectations for
their realization. When players aim is to achieve a minimum level of the
observed rate then the problem can be reduced to a game in which strate-
gies are setting of just levels. Discussion of such issues can be found in the
works of Sakaguchi (e.g. [10]). However and in those tasks, though, that
the information players are incomplete, lacking clear asymmetry players.
The pay-offs of the players are function of the thresholds and the perfect
comparison of the observed variable with these defined levels is guarantee.
Asymmetric tools in measure of the observed r.v. are presented by Sak-
aguchi and the Second Author.11 However, for private random variables.
These players with asymmetric tools applied to there same sequence are
subject of consideration in the paper.
1.3. Mathematical formulation of the problem.
In fine-tuning the mathematical model, we will use the methods of opti-
mal stopping of stochastic processes12 for Markov sequences13,14 and game
models with optimal stopping4 of such sequences, similar to what is done
in the works [15,16].
Let (Ω,F ,P) be enough reach probability space to define the random
sequence {Xn}
N
n=0, X· : Ω→ R ⊂ ℜ, N ∈ N∪{∞}. There are two observers
(and at the same time decision makers) of the basic sequence defined by
the mappings {ϕin}, i = 1, 2, where ϕ
i
n : ℜ
n → ℜ, having his aims defined
by the pay-off functions f i : R→ ℜ. Other words, the player i at moment
n observes ξin = ϕ
i
n(X1, . . . , Xn). The strategies of the players are stopping
times τ ∈ Si with respect to the appropriate filtrations F in = σ{ξ
i
1, . . . , ξ
i
n}.
Each player, based on the observations available to him, is tasked with
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choosing the moment of accepting the state of the process based on the
previous observations so as to maximize the expected payment.
vˆi = sup
τ i∈Si
Ef i(Xτ i). (1)
It can be used to reduce the initial problem to the task of optimal retention
of conditional expected values relative to its filtration.14 Let us calculate
for every n ∈ N
fˆ i(~ξin) = E[f
i(X in)|F
i
n].
We have
vˆi = sup
τ i∈Si
Efˆ i(~ξiτ i).
Let us assume that the observation processes {ξin}
N
n=0, i = 1, 2, belongs to
Markov processes. In this case the solution of the problem (1) can be get
by the procedure described by Shiryaev [14, Ch.3] which is based on the
Bellman-Jacobi equation. Denote Sn = {τ ∈ S : τ ≥ n}. When we have
two decision makers hunting for a convenient state of the process have the
right to declare the stopping at most twice. The second only, when the first
hired state is assigned to the opponent. The natural set of strategies are
Ui = {(τ i, {σin}
N
n=0) : τ
i ∈ S, σin ∈ S
i
n}. The pay-off in the competitive
case is defined in various way. Following the discussion in [16] for given
ρi ∈ Ui, i = 1, 2,
K1(ρ
1, ρ2) = E
[
I{τ1<τ2}
(
fˆ1(ξ1τ1)− vˆ
2(τ1, ξ2σ2
τ1
)
)
(3)
+ I{τ1=τ2}
[
p
(
fˆ1(ξ1τ1)− vˆ
2(τ1, ξ2σ2
τ1
)
)
+ (1− p)
(
vˆ1(τ2, ξ1σ1
τ2
)− fˆ2(ξ2τ2)
)]
+ I{τ1>τ2}
(
vˆ1(τ2, ξ1σ1
τ2
)− fˆ2(ξ2τ2)
)]
,
where IA is the characteristic function of A and
vˆi(n, ξin) = sup
τ i∈Si
n
Efˆ i(~ξiτ i)
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is the priority parameter, i.e. the probability that the state
will be assigned to the player 1. The pair of strategies (ρ1
⋆
, ρ2
⋆
) is the
solution of the problem if for every ρi ∈ Ui
K1(ρ
1⋆, ρ2
⋆
) ≥ K1(ρ
1, ρ2
⋆
) and K1(ρ
1⋆, ρ2
⋆
) ≥ K1(ρ
1⋆, ρ2).
In practice it is difficult to construct the solution and calculate the value
of the problem in such general form . However, for some natural cases each
player can estimate his final reward by calculating his potential reward
(award) based on his knowledge (filtration). The idea of these simplifica-
tions is presented in the next sections.
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2. Formulation of the game
2.1. The description of the model
Consider a game in which two players want to choose the best object overall.
They observe N objects sequentially. They get a profit only if the player
chooses the best object and the rival will not find the better one. In other
case he gets the award. If both players wants to stop on the current object
the nature chooses it by the fair coin toss. Suppose that:
(1) The player I has no information, i.e. he observes only the relative ranks
of the current objects.
(2) The player II has full information, i.e. he observes sequentially
X1, ..., XN i.i.d., sees its value, and also can calculate the rank of the
current object.
To be more specific let us denote by Yn the relative rank of the n-th obser-
vation
Yn = #{1 ≤ i ≤ n : Xi ≤ Xn}. (4)
The filtration of the player II is F
(1)
n = σ(X1, ..., Xn) and for the player I is
F
(2)
n = σ(Y1, ..., Yn). Note that F
(2)
n ⊂ F
(1)
n for every n. Denote by T1 a set
of all stopping times with respect to the family {Fn}
N
n=1. Let T
0
1 denote
a set of all stopping times τ ∈ T1 such that Xn = max{X1, ..., Xn} on
{τ = n}, n = 1, . . . , N . Define the moments where the biggest observation
appear, i.e. τ1 = 1, τk = inf{n : τk−1 ≤ n ≤ N,Xn = max{X1, ..., Xn}}
for k = 1, . . . , N . We observe that the sequence τ1, τ2, ... ∈ T
0
1 . Now let us
consider the following chain
Zk = (τk, Xτk) on {τk < N + 1}, Zk = (τN+1, ∂),
where ∂ is special absorbing state. It is easy to see that {Zk}
N+1
k=1 is a
Markov chain with transition probabilities (cf. [17])
p((n, x), (m,B)) = xm−n−1
∫
B
dy,m > n (5)
and 0 otherwise, with B ⊆ (x, 1].
The reward for the player II for stopping on nth object of the value
Xn = x is
s2,n(x) = x
N−n (6)
and for continuing observation is given by Gilbert & Mosteller3,17
c2,n(x) =
N∑
k=n+1
p((n, x), (k, (x, 1]))s1,k(y) =
N∑
k=n+1
xk−n−1(1 − xN−n)
N − k + 1
.
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In similar way for the player I consider a sequence of indicators {In}
N
n=1,
where Ik = I{Yk=1}. Let us denote by Gn = σ(I1, ...In) sequence of sigma
fields generated by indicators and let T2 be the set of all stopping moments
τ with respect to σ -fields Gn, n = 1, ..., N . Define a process ξt in the
following way
ξt = inf{n ≥ ξt−1 : In = 1}
with initial point ξ0 = 1. Calculate transition probabilities
13
pn,m = P (ξk+1 = m|ξk = n) =
n
m(m− 1)
. (7)
The first player’s reward for stopping on nth candidate (i.e. Yn = 1) is
s1,n =
n
N
and for continuing observations
c1,n =
N∑
k=n+1
n
k(k − 1)
k
N
=
n
N
N∑
k=n+1
1
k − 1
.
2.2. Equilibrium states.
Suppose that we are in some moment n and the value of the current can-
didate is x and both players want to stop. If the player II gets the object
(with probability 1 − p) he gets reward s1,n(x). With probability p the
player I gets the object so II must continue the observations and gets re-
ward c1,n(x). The situation that in the future the opponent will find the
best object is also included into the reward. Similar consideration gives us
the payoff for the player I. Let us denote:
w2,n(x) =

xN−n − xN−n N∑
j=n+1
xj−N−1 − 1
N − j + 1

 (8)
and
w1,n =
n
N

1− N∑
j=n+1
1
j − 1

 . (9)
Then the payoff matrix is given by
(v1,n, v2,n(x)) =
I\II S F
S (2p− 1)w1,n; (1− 2p)w2,n(x) w1,n;−w2,n(x)
F −w1,n;w2,n(x) Tv1,n, T v2,n(x)
(10)
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where T stands for the Bellman operator.14 Since both players want to
maximize their profits we have the following conditions) to (S,S) be a Nash
equilibrium: {
(2p− 1)w1,n ≥ −w1,n
(1− 2p)w2,n(x) ≥ w2,n(x)
(11a)
which leads to the equations

∑N
j=n+1
xj−N−1 − 1
N − j + 1
≤ 1∑N
j=n+1
1
j − 1
≤ 1
(11b)
For player I we get the optimal moments for stop. They are those number
n ≥ n∗ where n∗ is given by the standard optimal threshold (cf. [3]):
n∗ = max{0 ≤ n ≤ N :
N∑
k=n+1
1
k − 1
> 1}. (12)
and the optimal stopping set for player II is also the same set form the
standard optimal stopping problem
D = {(n, x) ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} × [0, 1] : Xn = x, x ≥ xn} (13)
where xn is the solution of equation
N−n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
= 1. (14)
The optimal stopping times are:
for the player I: τ1 = inf{n > n
∗, Yn = 1} and for the player II: τ2 = inf{n :
(n,Xn) : Xn = max{X1, ..., Xn} = x ≥ xn}..
Lemma 1. In the game described above strategy (S, S) is pure Nash equi-
librium if Xn is a local maximum and Xn ≥ xn, n > n
∗.
Let us consider case when p < 0.5. Suppose that n > n∗ and the value
of the current observation is Xm = x ≤ xn and its relative rank is 1. If
we are bellow this threshold then it is more optimal for player II to change
his strategy on F. The best response for player I on the strategy of the
opponent is continue stopping if the expected future reward is not greater
than the actual reward:
w1,n ≥ Tv1,n.
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To calculate the expected future reward we have to calculate the Bellman
operator for payoff Tv1,n. The no-information player knows that the op-
ponent has more information. Since the opponent chooses the strategy F
we know that the present value of the object is less than the threshold xn.
Suppose for a moment that we know this value and it is x. If we knew this
value the future payoff would be
T (v1,n|x) =
N∑
k=n+1
(
xk−n−1
∫ x∨xk
x
w1,kdy +
∫ 1
x∨xk
(2p− 1)w1,kdy
)
. (15)
where a ∨ b = max{a, b}. However we have to average it. Knowing that
the actual value is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, xn] (since the
opponent wishes to continue the observations) we get
Tv1,n =
1
xn
∫ xn
0
T (v1,n|x)dx. (16)
Let us consider the set M1 = {n
∗ < n ≤ N : Tv1,n ≤ w1,n}. Note that
this set in not empty. It contains the number {N}. Using method of
backward induction we can find the lower bound for this set, i.e. the index
n˜ = min{n∗ ≤ n ≤ N : Tv1,n ≤ w1,n}.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the current state of the process (n,Xn) is such
that n ≥ n˜, Xn = x ≤ xn. and Xn is a local maximum. Then the strategy
(S, F ) is the pure Nash equilibrium in the game described above.
Now suppose that n = n˜ − 1 and the current state of the process is
(n,Xn = x) where x ≤ xn. Since the player I changes his strategy into
F it is necessary to check whether the condition Tv2,n(x) ≥ w2,n(x) is
satisfied. Indeed it is true. Bellman’s operator is the expected value of the
future reward. Since now the reward w2,n(x) < 0 and the future reward is
positive for p < 0.5 it is more optimal to take an action F for the player II.
Now the same consideration are made for n˜− 2, n˜− 3, ... etc. So from this
considerations we have the following
Lemma 3. Suppose that the current state of the process (n,Xn) is such that
n ≤ n˜, Xn = x ≤ xn and Xn is a local maximum. Then the strategy (F, F )
is the pure Nash equilibrium in this state in the game described above.
Now consider the case when n = n∗ − 1 and Xn = x > xn is the local
maximum. This is the opposite situation when the player II prefers to stop
but the player I prefers to continue the observations. To find is strategy
(F, S) the equilibrium point we have to check is the condition
Tv2,n(x) ≤ w2,n(x).
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This is equivalent to the condition
2p
N−n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
≥ −(1− 2p)
N−n∑
k=1
k−1∑
j=1
(
j
k
x−k −
x−j
k − j
+
1
k
)
(17)
The expression under the double sum is positive in the interval [0, 1]. It
means that on the left hand side we have a positive number which is always
bigger than the expression on the right hand side which is negative. There
fore for n = n∗ − 1 and x > xn it is better for player II to not change his
strategy. Continuing this calculations we get that it is also better to not
change his strategy when n < n∗ and x > xn.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the current state of the process (n,Xn) is such
that n < n∗, Xn = x > xn and Xn is a local maximum. Then the strategy
(F, S) is the pure Nash equilibrium in the game described above.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the current state of the process (n,Xn) is such
that n < n∗, Xn = x ≤ xn and Xn is a local maximum. Then the strategy
(F, F ) is the pure Nash equilibrium in the game described above.
3. Numerical example.
3.1. Value of the game.
Fig. 1. Boundaries of the strategies for N = 10, p = 0.25. The shift for the player I is
clearly visible. In this case n∗ = 4 but n˜ = 5.
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The value of the game for different values of priority parameter p and
N = 10 is presented bellow.
(val1,10, val2,10) =(−0.00201, 0.19557), p = 0.1
(val1,10, val2,10) =(0.03283, 0.12896), p = 0.25
(val1,10, val2,10) =(0.06897, 0.08796), p = e
−1
(val1,10, val2,10) =(0.13662, 0.03787), p = 0.5
3.2. Shift of the threshold for player I
The table bellow presents different values of the threshold n˜ for different
horizons and values of the priority parameter p.
N n∗ n˜
p = 0.1 p = 0.2 p = 0.25 p = 1/3 p = e−1 p = 0.5
5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
10 4 4 5 5 5 5 6
20 8 9 10 10 11 11 12
30 12 14 15 15 16 17 18
50 19 24 26 26 28 28 31
4. Conclusion
The model presented in this work was created as a fruit of reflection on real
problems in the field of business and finance. In the competition between
two opponents from which one of them has access to more data we have
found the equilibrium states. If the priority parameter of no-information
player p ≤ 0.5 we have found that no-information player has to change
his strategy in relation to the situation if he remained in the game alone.
However the full-information player does not intend to change his strategy.
The numerical examples presented here are good presentation of the model.
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